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Abstract
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the
players are described by binary relations. All restrictions imposed on the preferences are satisfied
in the case of epsilon-optimization of a bounded-above utility function. A Nash equilibrium exists
and can be reached from any strategy profile after a finite number of best response improvements
if the single crossing conditions hold w.r.t. pairs [one player’s strategy, a profile of other players’
strategies], and the preference relations are transitive. If, additionally, there are just two players,
every best response improvement path reaches a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. If
each player is only affected by a linear combination of the strategies of others, the single crossing
conditions hold w.r.t. pairs [one player’s strategy, an aggregate of the strategies of others], and the
preference relations are interval orders, then a Nash equilibrium exists and can be reached from any
strategy profile with a finite best response path.
Key words: strong acyclicity; single crossing; Cournot tatonnement; Nash equilibrium; aggregative
game
JEL Classification Number: C72.
1 Introduction
When the existence of the maximum of a function to be maximized cannot be guaranteed, a usual
practice is to switch to ε-optimization. However, the practice is not costless: we forfeit the ability
to apply necessary conditions. Similarly, faced with possible non-existence of the best responses in
a strategic game, we may assume that the players only ε-optimize, but then we may find the usual
sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium inapplicable.
As an example relevant to this paper, let us consider games of strategic complementarity (Topkis,
1979; Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Suppose each utility function is supermodular and
bounded above in own choice, but may be discontinuous, hence need not attain a maximum. Even if
the increasing differences condition holds, the ε-best response correspondence need not be ascending;
it is only weakly ascending under these strong assumptions. The set of ε-best responses to a particular
profile of strategies of other players need not be a lattice and need not be chain-complete, hence the
existence of an increasing selection cannot be derived even from Veinott (1989, Theorem 3.2), so there
is nothing to apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem to.
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More sophisticated, in particular, ordinal techniques developed later (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994;
Shannon, 1995; Athey, 2001; Quah, 2007; Quah and Strulovici, 2009; Reny, 2011) do not help in this
situation. To the best of my knowledge, the previous literature contains no existence result for ε-Nash
equilibria in games of strategic complementarity (to say nothing of strategic substitutability) where
the existence of the best responses is not guaranteed.
Although this paper has been motivated by the problems with ε-Nash equilibrium, we actually
work in a much broader context. Namely, we consider agents whose preferences are described by
binary relations, on which any restrictions are imposed only when necessary. The only assumption
made throughout is strong acyclicity, which ensures the existence of undominated alternatives. In the
case of ε-optimization of a function bounded above, this assumption holds. We also assume that the
strategy sets are ordered; in all the theorems, the order is linear.
Besides the existence of equilibria, we also consider adaptive (“best response”) dynamics. Actually,
we consider two different scenarios that coincide in the “standard” case of preferences described by
utility functions. In the case of ε-optimization, the difference is whether to demand that the new,
ε-optimal, strategy should be a noticeable (more than ε) improvement over the current strategy or not.
Theorem 2 shows that a Nash equilibrium exists and can be reached from any strategy profile
after a finite number of best response improvements if the strategy sets are chains, the single crossing
conditions hold w.r.t. pairs <one player’s strategy, a profile of other players’ strategies>, and the
preference relations are transitive. If there are just two players, every best response improvement path
reaches a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps (Theorem 3). [Theorems 2 and 3, respectively,
from Kukushkin et al. (2005) are a bit stronger, but restricted to the “standard” case of a finite game
with preferences described by utility functions.]
Theorem 1 establishes the existence of an increasing selection from the best response correspondence
when both available choices and parameters form chains, and the preference relation is an interval
order. That theorem is applicable to aggregative games (Novshek, 1985; Kukushkin, 1994, 2004, 2005;
Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010). For instance, in Theorem 4, each player is only affected by a linear
combination of the strategies of others with a symmetrical matrix of coefficients, the single crossing
conditions hold w.r.t. pairs <one player’s strategy, an aggregate of the strategies of others>, and the
preference relations are interval orders. Then a Nash equilibrium exists and can be reached from any
strategy profile with a finite best response path (possibly, with insignificant improvements along the
way).
Section 2 introduces basic notions concerning preferences and choice. In Section 3, the single
crossing conditions and Theorem 1 are formulated. In Section 4, our principal model is introduced: a
strategic game where the preferences of each player are defined by a family of binary relations on own
strategies, with the choices of others as parameters. Section 5 contains applications of Theorem 1 to
aggregative games. Most proofs are deferred to Section 6; a few concluding remarks are in Section 7.
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2 Preferences and choice
We start with, more or less, standard notions related to individual choice. Let the preferences of an
agent over alternatives from a set X be described by a binary relation Â. For every Y ⊆ X, we denote
M(Y,Â) := {x ∈ Y | @ y ∈ Y [y Â x]}, (1)
the set of “optimal,” or rather acceptable, choices from Y .
Remark. Throughout this paper, we are only interested in the choice (by each agent) from a single
set. However, considering the (potential) choices by the same agent from subsets helps to clarify the
relationships between various assumptions in the theorems to follow.
A binary relationÂ is strongly acyclic if there exists no infinite sequence 〈xk〉k∈N such that xk+1 Â xk
for each k.
Proposition 1. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has the property that M(Y,Â) 6= ∅
whenever X ⊇ Y 6= ∅ if and only if it is strongly acyclic.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
A binary relation Â has the NM-property on a subset Y ⊆ X if
∀x ∈ Y \M(Y,Â)∃y ∈M(Y,Â) [y Â x]. (2)
Proposition 2. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has the NM-property on every
nonempty subset Y ⊆ X if and only if it is strongly acyclic and transitive.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
A binary relation Â has the strong NM-property on a subset Y ⊆ X if
∀{x0, . . . , xm} ⊆ Y \M(Y,Â)∃y ∈M(Y,Â)∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,m} [y Â xk]. (3)
An irreflexive relation Â is called an interval order if it satisfies the condition
∀x, y, a, b ∈ X [ [y Â x & a Â b]⇒ [y Â b or a Â x] ]. (4)
Equivalently, Â is an interval order if and only if there are a chain L and two mappings u+, u− : X → L
such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
u+(x) ≥ u−(x); y Â x ⇐⇒ u−(y) > u+(x).
Proposition 3. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has the strong NM-property on every
nonempty subset Y ⊆ X if and only if it is a strongly acyclic interval order.
A routine proof is given for completeness.
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Proof. To prove the sufficiency, we assume {x0, . . . , xm} ⊆ Y \M(Y,Â). When m = 0, we just invoke
Proposition 2. Then we argue by induction. For m > 0, the induction hypothesis implies the existence
of y′ ∈ M(Y,Â) such that y′ Â xk for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1; we also have y′′ ∈ M(Y,Â) such that
y′′ Â xm. For each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, we apply (4) to xk, y′, y′′, xm, obtaining that either y′ Â xm or
y′′ Â xk for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1. In either case, we are home.
Conversely, if (4) does not hold, we have M({x, y, a, b},Â) = {y, a}, hence (3) does not hold for
Y = {x, y, a, b} and {x, b} ⊆ Y \M(Y,Â).
As an example, let u : X → R be bounded above and ε > 0; let the preference relation be
y Â x­ u(y) > u(x) + ε. (5)
It is easy to see that Â is a strongly acyclic interval order (actually, a semiorder). M(X,Â) consists
of all ε-maxima of u on X.
A binary relation Â has the revealed preference property on a subset Y ⊆ X if
∀x, y ∈ Y [x /∈M(Y,Â) 3 y ⇒ y Â x]. (6)
An ordering is an irreflexive, transitive, and negatively transitive (z 6Â y 6Â x ⇒ z 6Â x) binary
relation. Equivalently, Â is an ordering if and only if there are a chain L and a mapping u : X → L
such that
y Â x ⇐⇒ u(y) > u(x) (7)
holds for all x, y ∈ X.
Proposition 4. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has both the revealed preference
property and M(Y,Â) 6= ∅ on every nonempty subset Y ⊆ X if and only if it is a strongly acyclic
ordering.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
Most often, the preferences in game theory are described with a utility function u : X → R satisfying
(7) for all x, y ∈ X. Actually, real values as such are not necessary to derive the existence of a Nash
equilibrium from Tarski’s fixed point theorem and to obtain the usual monotone comparative statics
results under strategic complementarity. What is needed for the standard techniques to work is just
the revealed preference property (6) for Y = X.
Technically speaking, this paper is about how, and to what extent, (6) could be replaced with
weaker properties (2) or (3).
3 Parametric preferences and single crossing conditions
To the end of the paper, the preferences are described by a family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations, rather
than a single relation, parameter s reflecting the choices of other agents. We define the best response
correspondence:
R(s) :=M(X,Âs). (8)
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Henceforth, we always assume alternatives and parameters to be partially ordered sets (posets). A
parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S on X has the single crossing property if these conditions hold:
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs x & y > x]⇒ y Âs′ x]; (9a)
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs′ x & y < x]⇒ y Âs x]. (9b)
This definition is equivalent to Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) if every Âs is an ordering represented by
a numeric function.
For a family of preference relations defined by ε-optimization (5) with a parameter s in the function,
both conditions (9) hold if u(x, s) satisfies Topkis’s (1979) increasing differences condition:
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ ≥ s & y ≥ x]⇒ u(y, s′)− u(x, s′) ≥ u(y, s)− u(x, s)]. (10)
When X and S are chains, the condition is equivalent to the supermodularity of u (as a function on
the lattice X × S).
Given a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S on X, an increasing selection from R is a mapping r : S → X
such that r(s) ∈ R(s) for every s ∈ S and r(s′′) ≥ r(s′) whenever s′, s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ≥ s′.
Theorem 1. Let X and S be chains such that both minS and maxS exist. Let a parametric family
〈Âs〉s∈S of strongly acyclic relations on X satisfy single crossing conditions (9). Let every Âs (s ∈ S)
have the strong NM-property on X. Then there exists an increasing selection r from R on S such that
r(S) is finite.
The proof is deferred to Section 6.1.
Corollary. Let X and S be chains such that both minS and maxS exist. Let a parametric family
〈Âs〉s∈S of strongly acyclic interval orders on X satisfy single crossing conditions (9). Then there exists
an increasing selection from R on S such that r(S) is finite.
4 Strategic games and Cournot taˆtonnement
We define a strategic game in a way that is not quite standard. There is a finite set N of players and
a set Xi of strategies for each i ∈ N . We denote XN :=
∏
i∈N Xi and X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj . Each player
i’s preferences are described by a parametric family of binary relations Âx−ii (x−i ∈ X−i) on Xi. Then
we have the best response correspondence Ri for each player i ∈ N , defined by (8) with S := X−i,
X := Xi, and Âx−ii as Âs.
Remark. The idea that the preferences of players in a non-cooperative game should be only about
their own strategies (with the choices of others as parameters) was championed by Olga Bondareva
(1979).
With every strategic game, a number of improvement relations on XN are associated (i ∈ N ,
yN , xN ∈ XN ):
yN .
Ind
i xN ­ [y−i = x−i & yi Âx−ii xi]; (11a)
yN .
Ind xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN .Indi xN ] (11b)
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(individual improvement relation);
yN .
BR
i xN ­ [yN .Indi xN & yi ∈ Ri(x−i)]; (12a)
yN .
BR xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN .BRi xN ] (12b)
(best response improvement relation);
yN .
[BR]
i xN ­ [y−i = x−i & xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi]; (13a)
yN .
[BR] xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN .[BR]i xN ] (13b)
(best response “quasi-improvement” relation).
If yN .BRi xN , then both yN .
Ind
i xN and yN .
[BR]
i xN . The relation yN .
Ind
i xN implies yN .
BR
i xN
if Âx−ii is “two-levelled,” i.e., zi Âx−ii yi Âx−ii xi is impossible for any x−i ∈ X−i; yN .[BR]i xN implies
yN .
BR
i xN if Âx−ii has the revealed preference property (6) on Xi.
In the case of ε-optimization (5), the difference between .BRi and .
[BR]
i is whether to demand that
the dominating strategy should, besides being ε-optimal, be a significant (more than ε) improvement
over the “inferior” strategy, or not. If the preferences are even less similar to those described by a
utility function (e.g., a Pareto combination of several utility functions), a quasi-improvement may be
no improvement at all, hence associated dynamics may be of very limited interest.
By definition, a Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of .Ind, i.e., an xN ∈ XN such that yN .Ind xN is
impossible for any yN ∈ XN . When each player’s preferences are represented, in the sense of (7), with
a utility function ui(xN ), this definition is equivalent to the standard one. It may be worthwhile to
note that the question of, say, (in)efficiency of equilibria makes no sense in our framework. Assuming
that the preferences are described by (5), our definition transforms into that of an ε-Nash equilibrium
(w.r.t. the utility functions).
Every Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of .BR and .[BR]; the converse need not be true. However,
if x0N ∈ XN is a maximizer of .[BR] and Ri(x0−i) 6= ∅ for each i ∈ N , then x0N is a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, x0N ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if it is a maximizer of .BR and each Â
x0−i
i has the NM-property.
A (finite or infinite) sequence of strategy profiles 〈xkN 〉k∈N is a best response (quasi)-improvement
path if xk+1N .
BR xkN (x
k+1
N .
[BR] xkN ) whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined. A game Γ has the finite best
response improvement property (FBRP) if it admits no infinite best response improvement path. Γ has
the weak FBRP if, for every x0N ∈ XN , there is a finite best response improvement path x0N , . . . , xmN
such that xmN is a Nash equilibrium. The (weak) finite best response quasi-improvement property, (weak)
F[BR]P, is defined similarly.
The notion of a restricted FBRP, a property intermediate between FBRP and weak FBRP, was
defined in Kukushkin (2004, Section 6, p. 103). Here we employ a similar version of F[BR]P. Let,
for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, a nonempty subset R∗i (x−i) ⊆ Ri(x−i) be given. We define the
corresponding admissible best response quasi-improvement relation by:
yN .
[BR]∗
i xN ­ [y−i = x−i & xi /∈ Ri(x−i) & yi ∈ R∗i (x−i)]; (14a)
yN .
[BR]∗ xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN .[BR]
∗
i xN ]. (14b)
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An admissible best response quasi-improvement path is a (finite or infinite) sequence of strategy profiles
〈xkN 〉k∈N such that xk+1N .[BR]
∗
xkN whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined.
A game Γ has a restricted finite best response quasi-improvement property (restricted F[BR]P)
if there is a collection of admissible best response correspondences R∗i such that Γ admits no infinite
admissible best response improvement path. As noted above, whether the “quasi-improvement-related”
dynamic properties deserve much interest by themselves depends on the degree of rationality of the
preferences. Nonetheless, even the weakest of those properties, the weak F[BR]P, implies the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in any case.
In all the theorems to follow, we consider games where strategy sets Xi are posets, actually, chains.
Then both XN :=
∏
i∈N Xi and all X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj are posets too with the Cartesian product of the
orders on components.
Theorem 2. Let each Xi in a game Γ be a chain containing its maximum and minimum. Let the
parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions (9) and every Âx−ii be
strongly acyclic and transitive. Then Γ has the weak FBRP, i.e., a Nash equilibrium can be reached
from any strategy profile after a finite number of best response improvements (12).
The proof is deferred to Section 6.2.
Theorem 3. Let each Xi in a two player game Γ be a chain containing its maximum and minimum.
Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions (9), and every
Âx−ii be strongly acyclic and have the NM-property. Then Γ has the FBRP, i.e., every best response
improvement path reaches a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps.
The proof is deferred to Section 6.3.
There may be no FBRP if n > 2 (Kukushkin et al., 2005, Example 4), and no weak FBRP if Xi
are not chains (Kukushkin et al., 2005, Example 2), even if the preferences are described with utility
functions and all Xi are finite.
Interestingly, there are no restrictions on the chains Xi apart from the existence of their maxima
and minima; those assumptions, however, are essential.
Example 1. Let N := {1, 2}, X1 := X2 := ]0, 1] (with the natural order); let preferences of the players
be defined by (5) with utility functions u1(x1, x2) := min{2x1 − x2, (x2 − 2x1)/x2} and u2(x1, x2) :=
min{2x2−x1, (x1−2x2)/x1}, and 0 < ε < 1. All assumptions of Theorem 3 are satisfied except for the
existence of minXi; single crossing conditions (9) hold because both utility functions are supermodular.
There is no (ε-)Nash equilibrium: x2 ≤ (1 + ε)x1/2 whenever x2 ∈ R2(x1), while x1 ≤ (1 + ε)x2/2
whenever x1 ∈ R1(x2); therefore, there should hold x1 ≤ (1 + ε)2x1/4 < x1 at any equilibrium.
5 Aggregative games
An aggregative game is a strategic game where each Xi is a subset of R and there are mappings
σi : X−i → R (aggregation rules) such that every preference relation Âx−ii only depends on σi(x−i).
For each i ∈ N , we denote Si := σi(X−i) ⊂ R in this case, and use notation Âsii instead of Âx−ii and
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Ri(si) :=M(Xi,Âsi). Assuming that each player’s preferences satisfy single crossing conditions (9), we
can apply Theorem 1.
If each σi is increasing in each xj , then Theorem 2 is applicable, so aggregation becomes redundant
in a sense. Otherwise, certain restrictions should be imposed on the aggregation rules; exactly what
is needed remains unclear, but quite a number of sufficient conditions have been established for the
standard case of a game with utility functions where the best responses exist everywhere (Novshek,
1985; Kukushkin, 1994, 2004, 2005; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010).
Without addressing the general problem, we just present a couple of appropriate collections of
aggregation rules, which seem most interesting from the viewpoint of possible applications.
Theorem 4. Let Γ be an aggregative game where each strategy set contains its maximum and minimum,
σi(x−i) =
∑
j 6=i aijxj with aij = aji ∈ R whenever j 6= i, every Âsii is strongly acyclic and has the strong
NM-property. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions
(9). Then Γ has a restricted F[BR]P.
The proof is deferred to Section 6.4.
Corollary. Let Γ be a strategic game with a strategy set Xi ⊂ R for each i ∈ N and utility functions
of the form ui(xN ) = Ui(xi,
∑
j 6=i aijxj), where aij = aji ∈ R whenever j 6= i. Let each Xi contain its
maximum and minimum, each Ui(·, si) be bounded above, and the increasing differences condition (10)
be satisfied by each Ui. Then Γ possesses an ε-Nash equilibrium for every ε > 0.
If the preferences of the players are described just by utility functions, then .BR and .[BR] are
equivalent, hence F[BR]P and FBRP become the same thing. However, the FBRP cannot be asserted
in Theorem 4, even for a finite game with such nice preferences.
Example 2. Let N := {1, 2, 3}, X1 := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, X2 := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, X3 := {0, 1}; let the
preferences of the players be defined by the utility functions ui(xN ) = Ui(xi,−
∑
j 6=i xj). Clearly,
we have an aggregative game as in Theorem 4 with aij = −1, hence S1 = {−6,−5, . . . , 0}, S2 =
{−5,−4, . . . , 0}, S3 = {−9,−8, . . . , 0}. Let the utilities be:
U1 : U2 : U3 :
0 2 2 2 2 2 4
1 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2


0 0 0 2 2 2
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1

[
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
]
where own choice, xi, is on the ordinates axis, and si (= minus the sum of the partners’ choices), on the
abscissae axis. Conditions (9), even (10), are easy to check. By Theorem 4, the game has a restricted
F[BR]P; actually, even a restricted FBRP. However, it does not have the FBRP since there is a best
response improvement cycle:
(3, 0, 0) 1−−−−→ (4, 0, 0) 3−−−−→ (4, 0, 1) 1−−−−→ (1, 0, 1)x2 y2
(3, 5, 0) 1←−−−− (0, 5, 0) 3←−−−− (0, 5, 1) 1←−−−− (1, 5, 1)
.
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Remark. If we retained the same sets Xi and utilities Ui, but redefined σi, setting aij := 1 for all
i, j ∈ N , j 6= i, then there would be no best response improvement cycle (Kukushkin, 2004, Theorem 1).
Theorem 5. Let Γ be an aggregative game where each strategy set contains its maximum and minimum,
σi(x−i) = maxj∈I(i) xj with j ∈ I(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ I(j), every Âsii is strongly acyclic and has the strong
NM-property. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions
(9). Then Γ has a restricted F[BR]P.
Theorem 6. Let Γ be an aggregative game where each strategy set contains its maximum and minimum,
σi(x−i) = −maxj∈I(i) xj with j ∈ I(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ I(j), every Âsii is strongly acyclic and has the strong
NM-property. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions
(9). Then Γ has a restricted F[BR]P.
Both proofs are deferred to Section 6.5.
Corollary. Let Γ be a strategic game with a strategy set Xi ⊂ R for each i ∈ N and utility functions
of the form ui(xN ) = Ui(xi,−maxj∈I(i) xj), where j ∈ I(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ I(j). Let each Xi contain its
maximum and minimum, each Ui(·, si) be bounded above, and the increasing differences condition (10)
be satisfied by each Ui. Then Γ possesses an ε-Nash equilibrium for every ε > 0.
Theorem 7. Let Γ be an aggregative game where each strategy set contains its maximum and minimum,
σi(x−i) = minj∈I(i) xj with j ∈ I(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ I(j), every Âsii is strongly acyclic and has the strong
NM-property. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions
(9). Then Γ has a restricted F[BR]P.
Theorem 8. Let Γ be an aggregative game where each strategy set contains its maximum and minimum,
σi(x−i) = −minj∈I(i) xj with j ∈ I(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ I(j), every Âsii is strongly acyclic and has the strong
NM-property. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions
(9). Then Γ has a restricted F[BR]P.
If a game satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 7 or 8, then it satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 5
or 6 after the order on each strategy set is reversed (each Xi is replaced with −Xi).
Naturally, Theorem 8 admits a corollary virtually identical to that of Theorem 6. Similar statements
related to Theorems 5 and 7 immediately follow from Theorem 2.
6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We call a subset S′ ⊆ S an interval if s ∈ S′ whenever s′ < s < s′′ and s′, s′′ ∈ S′. The intersection of
any number of intervals is an interval too.
Lemma 6.1.1. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations on a chain X satisfy both conditions
(9). Let every Âs have the NM-property on X. Then the set {s ∈ S | x ∈ R(s)}, for every x ∈ X, is an
interval.
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Proof. Suppose the contrary: s′ < s < s′′ and x ∈ R(s′) ∩ R(s′′), but x /∈ R(s). By (2), we can pick
x∗ ∈ R(s) such that x∗ Âs x. If x∗ > x, we have x∗ Âs′′ x by (9a), contradicting the assumed x ∈ R(s′′).
If x∗ < x, we have x∗ Âs′ x by (9b) with the same contradiction.
The key role is played by the following recursive definition of sequences xk ∈ X, sk ∈ S, and Sk ⊆ S
(k ∈ N) such that:
sk ∈ Sk; (15a)
Sk is an interval; (15b)
∀s ∈ Sk [xk ∈ R(s)]; (15c)
∀m < k [Sk ∩ Sm = ∅]; (15d)
∀m < k [[sk < sm ⇒ xk < xm] & [sk > sm ⇒ xk > xm]]; (15e)
∀m < k [xk Âsk xm or xm ∈ R(sk)]; (15f)
∀s ∈ S [[xk ∈ R(s) & s /∈ Sk]⇒ ∃m < k (s ∈ Sm or s < sm < sk or sk < sm < s )]. (15g)
We start with an arbitrary s0 ∈ S, pick x0 ∈ R(s0), and set S0 := {s ∈ S | x0 ∈ R(s)}. Now (15a),
(15c), and (15g) for k = 0 immediately follow from the definitions; (15b), from Lemma 6.1.1; (15d),
(15e), and (15f) hold vacuously.
Let k ∈ N \ {0}, and let xm, sm, Sm satisfying (15) have been defined for all m < k. We define
S¯k :=
⋃
m<k S
m. For every s ∈ S¯k, there is a unique, by (15d), µ(s) < k such that s ∈ Sµ(s). By (15c),
r(s) := xµ(s) is a selection from R on S¯k. The conditions (15b) and (15e) imply that r is increasing. If
S¯k = S, then we already have an increasing selection, so we stop the process.
Otherwise, we pick sk ∈ S \ S¯k arbitrarily and denote K− := {m < k | sm < sk}, K+ := {m <
k | sm > sk} K∗ := {m < k | xm /∈ R(sk)}, m− := argmaxm∈K− sm, m+ := argminm∈K+ sm, and
I := {s ∈ S | sm− < s < sm+}. If one of K± is empty (both cannot be), the respective m± is left
undefined, in which case I := {s ∈ S | sm− < s} or I := {s ∈ S | s < sm+}.
By the strong NM-property of Âsk , we can pick xk ∈ R(sk) such that xk Âsk xm for each m ∈ K∗,
hence (15f) holds. Finally, we define Sk := {s ∈ S \ S¯k | xk ∈ R(s)} ∩ I. Now the conditions (15a),
(15c), and (15d) immediately follow from the definitions; (15b) and (15g), from Lemma 6.1.1.
Checking (15e) needs a bit more effort. If we assume that xm
− ∈ R(sk), then the condition (15g)
for m− and sk implies the existence of m < m− such that sm− < sm < sk, contradicting the definition
of m−; therefore, xk Âsk xm− by (15f). If xk < xm− then xk Âsm− xm− by (9b), contradicting (15c) for
m−. Therefore, xk > xm− ≥ xm for all m ∈ K−. A dual argument shows that xk < xm+ ≤ xm for all
m ∈ K+. Thus, (15e) holds.
To summarize, either we obtain an increasing selection on some step, or our sequences are defined
[and satisfy (15)] for all k ∈ N.
Lemma 6.1.2. If conditions (15) hold for all k ∈ N, then there exists an increasing sequence 〈kh〉h∈N
such that skh is either monotone increasing or monotone decreasing in h, and xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh for each
h ∈ N.
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Proof. We denote N↓, respectively, N↑, the set of k ∈ N such that sm < sk, or sm > sk, holds for an
infinite number of m ∈ N. Clearly, N = N↓ ∪ N↑; without restricting generality, N↓ 6= ∅. We consider
two alternatives.
Let there exist min{sk | k ∈ N↓} = s∗; then the set {m ∈ N | sm < sk} is finite for every sk < s∗,
hence the set {m ∈ N | sk < sm < s∗} is infinite. We define k0 := min{k ∈ N | sk < s∗}, and then
recursively define kh+1 as the least k ∈ N for which skh < sk < s∗. The minimality of kh ensures
that kh+1 > kh. Whenever skh < sm < skh+1 , we have m > kh+1 by the same minimality; therefore,
xkh /∈ R(skh+1) by (15g), hence xkh+1 Âskh+1 xkh by (15f).
Let min{sk | k ∈ N↓} not exist; then the set {m ∈ N↓ | sm < sk} is nonempty (actually, infinite)
for every k ∈ N↓. We set k0 := minN↓, and then recursively define kh+1 as the least k ∈ N↓ for which
sk < skh . The minimality of kh again ensures that kh+1 > kh. Whenever skh+1 < sm < skh , we have
m ∈ N↓, hence m > kh+1; therefore, xkh /∈ R(skh+1) by (15g), hence xkh+1 Âs
kh+1
xkh by (15f).
The final step of the proof consists in showing that the existence of a sequence described in
Lemma 6.1.2 contradicts the strong acyclicity assumption. If skh is increasing, the relations xkh+1 Âskh+1
xkh “translate,” by (9a), to xkh+1 ÂmaxS xkh for each h ∈ N. If skh is decreasing, we obtain xkh+1 ÂminS
xkh for each h ∈ N by (9b).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We define
X↑ := {xN ∈ XN | ∀i ∈ N ∀yN ∈ XN [yN .BRi xN ⇒ yi > xi]}. (16)
Lemma 6.2.1. If xN ∈ X↑ and yN .BR xN , then yN ∈ X↑ too.
Proof. Let yN .BRi xN ; then yi > xi since xN ∈ X↑. Suppose, to the contrary, that there are zN ∈ XN
and j ∈ N such that zN .BRj yN and yj > zj . Since yi ∈ Ri(y−i), we have j 6= i, hence z−j = y−j > x−j ,
hence zj Âx−jj xj by (9b), hence xj /∈ Rj(x−j). Now we have zj /∈ Rj(x−j) because we would have
(zj , x−j) .BRj xN and zj < xj [= yj ] otherwise, contradicting the assumption xN ∈ X↑. Since Âx−jj has
NM-property, there is z′N ∈ XN such that z′N .BRj (zj , x−j). Since Âx−jj is transitive, we have z′N .BRj xN
as well. Therefore, z′j > xj because xN ∈ X↑, hence (z′j , y−j) .BRj zN by (9a), hence zj /∈ Rj(y−j),
contradicting our assumption zN .BRj yN .
If x0N ∈ X↑, but is not an equilibrium, we pick an arbitrary x1N ∈ XN such that x1N .BR x0N ; then
x1N ∈ X↑ by Lemma 6.2.1. Iterating this operation, we obtain a best response improvement path 〈xkN 〉k
such that xkN ∈ X↑ whenever xkN is defined. Besides, xk+1i > xki whenever xk+1N .BRi xkN ; by (9a), we
have xk+1i ÂmaxX−ii xki for all such k. If the path is infinite, then we will have an infinite number of
improvements for, at least, one i (actually, two), contradicting the assumed strong acyclicity. Therefore,
it must stop at some stage, and that is only possible at an equilibrium.
If x0N /∈ X↑, we pick i ∈ N and x1N ∈ XN such that x1N .BRi x0N and x1i < x0i ; if x1N /∈ X↑, we
behave similarly. Iterating this operation as long as xkN /∈ X↑, we obtain a best response improvement
path 〈xkN 〉k such that xk+1i < xki whenever xk+1N .BRi xkN . The path cannot be infinite for the same (or
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rather dual) reason as in the previous paragraph. Once xkN ∈ X↑, we already know that an infinite
best response improvement path is impossible.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Without restricting generality, we may assume N = {1, 2}. Suppose to the contrary that 〈xkN 〉k∈N is
an infinite best response improvement path. Since we could start the path anyplace, we may assume
that, for all k ∈ N,
x2k1 /∈ R1(x2k2 ) 3 x2k+11 = x2k+21 ; R2(x2k1 ) 3 x2k2 = x2k+12 /∈ R2(x2k+11 ).
Again without restricting generality, we may assume x11 > x
0
1. Now if we suppose that x
2
2 < x
0
2,
then the relation x22 Âx
1
1
2 x
0
2 and condition (9b) would imply x
2
2 Âx
0
1
2 x
0
2, contradicting our assumption
x02 ∈ R2(x01). A straightforward inductive argument shows that x2k+22 > x2k+12 and x2k+11 > x2k1 for all
k ∈ N. Now the relation x2k+22 Âx
2k+1
1
2 x
2k
2 and condition (9a) imply x
2k+2
2 ÂmaxX12 x2k2 for all k ∈ N,
which fact contradicts the strong acyclicity of ÂmaxX12 .
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Since each Xi contains its maximum and minimum, the same holds for each Si. Applying Theorem 1,
we obtain an increasing selection ri : Si → Xi from the best responses such that ri(Si) is finite for
each i ∈ N . Now we define an admissible best response quasi-improvement relation by (14) with
R∗i (x−i) := {ri(σi(x−i))}.
We have to show the impossibility of an infinite admissible best response quasi-improvement path.
Quite a number of auxiliary constructions are needed for that; they generally follow Dubey et al. (2006),
who, in their turn, used a trick developed by Huang (2002) for different purposes. The finiteness of
each ri(Si) simplifies something; the absence of upper hemicontinuity demands more subtlety, and here
we follow Kukushkin (2005).
For each i ∈ N , we denote ri(Si) = {x1i , . . . , xmii }, assuming xh+1i > xhi for all relevant h. For
every xi ∈ Xi, we define ηi(xi) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mi} as the minimal h such that xh+1i > xi; if no such h
exists, we set ηi(xi) := mi. Then we pick a list of shi ∈ [minSi,maxSi], h = 1, . . . ,mi − 1, such that
ri(si) < xh+1i whenever si < s
h
i and ri(si) > x
h
i whenever si > s
h
i . (If Si is an interval in R, then each shi
is determined uniquely.) For technical convenience, we add to the list s0i := minSi and s
mi
i := maxSi,
and denote ∆hi := s
h
i − sh−1i [> 0] for h = 1, . . . ,mi.
For every xN ∈ XN , we define a set N0(xN ) := {i ∈ N | xi ∈ ri(Si)} and a function
P (xN ) :=
∑
i∈N
[
−xi · sηi(xi)i +
∑
j∈N : j 6=i
1
2
aij · xi · xj +
ηi(xi)∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi
]
. (17)
For each i ∈ N , we define a binary relation .i on ri(Si) by setting (for each h ∈ {1, . . . ,mi − 1}
such that shi ∈ Si) xh+1i .i xhi if ri(shi ) = xh+1i , and xhi .i xh+1i if ri(shi ) = xhi .
Lemma 6.4.1. Let i ∈ N , zi, yi, xi ∈ ri(Si), and zi .i yi .i xi. Then either zi > yi > xi or zi < yi < xi.
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Immediately follows from the definitions.
Then we extend .i to the whole Xi, setting yi .i xi whenever xi /∈ ri(Si) 3 yi, and define ..i as the
transitive closure of .i on Xi.
Lemma 6.4.2. Each relation ..i is irreflexive and transitive.
Immediately follows from Lemma 6.4.1.
Finally, we define the potential:
yN ÂÂ xN ⇐⇒
[
N0(yN ) ⊃ N0(xN ) or [N0(yN ) = N0(xN ) & P (yN ) > P (xN )] or(
N0(yN ) = N0(xN ) & P (yN ) = P (xN ) &
∀i ∈ N [yi = xi or yi ..i xi] & ∃i ∈ N [yi ..i xi]
)]
. (18)
Lemma 6.4.3. The relation ÂÂ is irreflexive and transitive.
Immediately follows from the definition.
Lemma 6.4.4. If yN .
[BR]∗
i xN , then yN ÂÂ xN .
Proof. By definition, yi = ri(σi(x−i)) and y−i = x−i, hence i ∈ N0(yN ). If xi /∈ ri(Si), then we have
N0(xN ) ⊂ N0(yN ) since yj = xj for all j 6= i; therefore, yN ÂÂ xN by the first lexicographic component
in (18). Otherwise, we have N0(xN ) = N0(yN ); let us compare P (yN ) and P (xN ).
Let yi = xh
′′
i and xi = x
h′
i ; we denote s¯i = σi(x−i). Since yi = ri(s¯i), we have s
h′′−1
i ≤ s¯i ≤ sh
′′
i .
Since
∑
j∈N : j 6=i aij · xj = s¯i, we have
P (yN ) = yi · (s¯i − sh′′i ) +
h′′∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi + C(x−i) = yi · (s¯i − sh
′′−1
i ) +
h′′−1∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi + C(x−i). (19)
Let us consider two alternatives.
A. Let yi > xi, i.e., h′′ > h′. Similarly to (19), we have
P (xN ) = xi·(s¯i−sh′i )+
h′∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi +C(x−i) = xi·(s¯i−sh
′′−1
i )+xi·(sh
′′−1
i −sh
′
i )+
h′∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi +C(x−i). (20)
Note that C(x−i) is indeed the same.
Subtracting (20) from (19), we obtain
P (yN )− P (xN ) = (yi − xi) · (s¯i − sh′′−1i ) +
h′′−1∑
h=h′+1
(xhi − xi) ·∆hi . (21)
The first term is non-negative; the second is the sum of strictly positive numbers. Thus, we have
P (yN ) ≥ P (xN ), and an equality is only possible if s¯i = sh′′−1i and h′′ = h′ + 1 (so the sum is empty).
The last situation means that yi .i xi, hence yi ..i xi as well. In other words, yN ÂÂ xN in any case.
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B. Let yi < xi, i.e., h′′ < h′. We ignore what follows the second equality sign in (19), and replace
(20) with
P (xN ) = xi ·(s¯i−sh′i )+
h′∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi +C(x−i) = xi ·(s¯i−sh
′′
i )+xi ·(sh
′′
i −sh
′
i )+
h′∑
h=1
xhi ·∆hi +C(x−i). (22)
Subtracting (22) from (19), we obtain
P (yN )− P (xN ) = (xi − yi) · (sh′′i − s¯i) +
h′∑
h=h′′+1
(xi − xhi ) ·∆hi . (23)
Again, P (yN ) ≥ P (xN ), and an equality is only possible if s¯i = sh′′i and h′ = h′′+1, which means that
yi .i xi, hence yi ..i xi as well. In other words, yN ÂÂ xN again.
Finally, let 〈xkN 〉k=0,1,... be an admissible best response quasi-improvement path, i.e., whenever xk+1N
is defined, there holds xk+1N .
[BR]∗
i x
k
N for some (unique) i ∈ N . By Lemma 6.4.4, we have xk+1N ÂÂ xkN .
We set N∗ := {i ∈ N | ∃k [xk+1i = ri(xk−i)]}. If i ∈ N \ N∗, then xki is the same for all k. Thus, our
path moves upwards (in the sense of ÂÂ) in a finite set ∏i∈N∗ ri(Si), hence it cannot be infinite.
6.5 Proof of Theorems 5 and 6
The two proofs are so similar that we do not have to distinguish almost to the very end.
Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4, we apply Theorem 1, obtaining an increasing selection from
the best responses ri : Si → Xi such that ri(Si) is finite for each i ∈ N . Then we again define an
admissible best response quasi-improvement relation by (14) with R∗i (x−i) := {ri(σi(x−i))}.
Denoting X0i := ri(Si) and X :=
⋃
i∈N X
0
i ⊂ R, we define strictly increasing mappings ρ : X → N
by ρ(x) := #{y ∈ X | y < x} (rank function) and ϕ : X → R by ϕ(x) := nρ(x), where n := #N .
Lemma 6.5.1. Let I ⊂ N , yI , xI ∈ X0I , and maxi∈I yi > maxi∈I xi. Then
∑
i∈I ϕ(yi) >
∑
i∈I ϕ(xi).
Proof. Let maxi∈I xi = µ. Then
∑
i∈I ϕ(yi) ≥ nµ+1, while
∑
i∈I ϕ(xi) ≤ #I · nµ < nµ+1.
Supposing, to the contrary, that 〈xkN 〉k∈N is an infinite admissible best response quasi-improvement
path, we denote N∗ := {i ∈ N | ∃k ∈ N [xk+1i = ri(xki )]} and consider two alternatives.
A. Let N∗ = N . We pick k¯ ∈ N such that xki ∈ X0i whenever k ≥ k¯. Clearly, 〈xkN 〉k≥k¯ is an
infinite admissible best response quasi-improvement path in a subgame where each player is restricted
to strategies from X0i . On the other hand, Lemma 6.5.1 implies that the subgame can be perceived
as generated by the aggregation rules σ∗i (x−i) :=
∑
j∈I(i) xj in the case of Theorem 5, or σ
∗
i (x−i) :=∑
j∈I(i)(−xj) in the case of Theorem 6. Therefore, it is covered by Theorem 4 in either case. The
contradiction proves both theorems.
B. Let N∗ ⊂ N . For each i ∈ N \ N∗, we have xki = x0i for all k. Therefore, we may consider
a reduced game with the set of active players N∗, and each i ∈ N \ N∗ always choosing x0i . The
game satisfies all assumptions of our theorem and 〈xkN 〉k∈N remains an infinite admissible best response
quasi-improvement path; besides, Alternative A holds. Now the argument of the previous paragraph
applies.
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7 Concluding remarks
7.1. If S in Theorem 1 does not contain either minimum or maximum, then an increasing selection
still exists, but r(S) need not be finite, hence the proof of Theorem 4 is no longer valid. Moreover,
Example 1 shows that a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist in this case. (A two-person game with
scalar strategies is aggregative by our definition.)
7.2. If every Ri(x−i) is a singleton, then a restricted FBRP (F[BR]P) is equivalent to the FBRP
(F[BR]P). If, additionally, every Âx−ii has the NM-property, then the FBRP and F[BR]P are equivalent.
If, additionally, #N = 2, then the FBRP is equivalent to the weak FBRP.
7.3. It is instructive to compare our Theorems 2 and 3 with Theorems 2 and 3, respectively, from
Kukushkin et al. (2005). The assertive parts are the same, whereas the assumptions are incomparable:
we do not require Xi’s to be finite, nor the preferences to be orderings, here; on the other hand,
non-scalar strategies were allowed there (to a certain extent).
7.4. A closer look at the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 shows that both remain valid if the maxima and
minima exist in all Xi but one. It remains unclear whether the transitivity assumption in Theorem 2
could be weakened to the NM-property.
7.5. It remains unclear whether the assumption that both X and S are chains can be dropped or
weakened in Theorem 1. From the game-theoretic viewpoint, however, the question does not seem
pressing. The existence of an ε-Nash equilibrium in a game with increasing best responses does not
require increasing selections (Theorem 2). If the best responses are, say, decreasing, then, indeed,
all existence results in the literature need increasing selections, but they also need the assumption
that each player is only affected by a scalar aggregate of the partners/rivals’ choices. In principle,
Theorem 1 of Jensen (2010) could be applicable to a game with non-scalar strategies, so an extension
of our Theorem 1 to non-scalar X could be useful; however, no interesting example of such a game has
emerged so far.
On the other hand, an extension of Theorem 1 to non-scalar S would allow us to add monotone
comparative statics of equilibria to Theorems 4–8. Such an extension looks quite plausible (as long as
X remains scalar), but there is no clear-cut theorem as yet.
7.6. Theorems 5 and 6 can be extended, with only minor changes in the proofs, to “lexicographic
aggregation” such as the Leximax or Leximin orderings. Aggregation rules σi should then be mappings
from X−i to chains “longer” than R.
7.7. The fact that we had to assume each strategy set in each theorem to be a chain is extremely
irritating. Unfortunately, I have no idea at the moment whether and how the assumption could be
dispensed with. On the other hand, a conjecture that (6) is indispensable when dealing with multi-
dimensional strategies seems premature: there is no counterexample, nor even a hint wherefrom such
an example could emerge.
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